Background: Aviation systems were developed to improve safety and have achieved remarkable results. Medicine has looked to replicate these systems; however, the gap in outcomes between the two industries remains vast. Bridging this chasm requires an in-depth analysis of the applicability of the aviation safety model in surgery. This study uses qualitative methods to explore how aviation-based practices may be adapted and applied more effectively in theatre. Methods: Data were collected using multiprofessional focus groups in a single centre. The focus groups involved discussion around teamwork and aviation-based non-technical skills. With consent, audio recordings were anonymized and transcribed. Qualitative (thematic) analysis was used to identify themes. Results: Five focus groups were conducted. Eight themes emerged, with a total of 18 subthemes. Themes were: current practice, customization, applicability, team performance, human factors, analogy, incidents and integration of skills. Extent and limitations of the aviation surgery analogy also emerged.
Introduction
Safety in aviation has reached impressive standards. In 2013, an estimated 3100 million people flew, with an incident rate of only 3.2 per million, 1 while an estimated 310 million people have surgery each year worldwide, with an in-hospital complication rate of 17% and mortality of 0.5%. 2 Complications are 50 000 times more likely in surgery and at least 50% of these may be avoidable. Surgeons aspire to reach the safety record of aviation, however without an understanding of how this might be possible. In aviation, the major cause of accidents is human error. [3] [4] [5] For several decades, training and operational procedures have been developed to minimize the impact of human error, with emphasis on human factors and non-technical skills, as well as on technical skills. Human factors include 'human performance … behaviour of individuals, their interactions with each other and with their environment'. 6 'Non-technical skills' are 'cognitive and social skills which have been shown to enhance performance and reduce error'. 7 These skills are essential for safe and efficient operation in high-risk and complex environments, such as the cockpit and the operating theatre. Several practices are now standard in aviation, including checklists, crew resource management (CRM), the sterile cockpit rule, standardized phraseology and alternation of role (Table S1 ). [8] [9] [10] The long-standing analogy between aviation and surgery has led to attempts to replicate the success of these aviation-based practices in theatre. However, success has been variable, largely inadequate and short-lived. Even the widely practiced WHO checklist, which showed an almost 50% relative reduction in mortality in the original study (1.5% to 0.8%), 11 has had much less success in the real Several issues arise from this prior work. First, the extent to which the analogy holds and whether aviation-based safety practices can be tailored to the operating theatre has not been investigated. Second, the impact of individual aviation-based practices has been investigated, not a bundled effect. Finally, quantitative methods were primarily used.
This study uses qualitative methods, which can be more useful when studying human factors, to explore the role of aviation-based practices in theatre, potential barriers to their success and how they may be tailored for application in theatre. The ultimate aim is to improve safety and efficiency in theatre to bridge the gap to aviation.
Methods
This study was approved by the University of Dundee Research Ethics Committee and conducted in the James Paget University Hospital, UK, with local Research and Development department approval.
Sampling
Theatre staff from all surgical specialties were invited to participate in a focus group. Theatre teams were treated as clusters, with a particular focus group containing participants who worked together regularly.
Focus group
All focus groups were facilitated by one investigator (AP). Prior written consent was obtained and a short introduction given to explain that the aim was to facilitate discussion around the following topics: previous teamwork training, the WHO checklist and other potential checklists, CRM, the sterile cockpit rule, the blackbox and alternation of role. To discuss a particular topic, a short prompt was given (e.g. explaining the meaning of CRM). As discussion around the topic drew to a close, the next topic was introduced. It was hoped that this kind of multiprofessional group would promote authentic interaction. The entire discussion was recorded, transcribed, anonymized and qualitative (thematic) analysis performed by one investigator (AP). Coding was used to identify sub-themes, which were then abstracted further and classified into themes.
14 The a priori topics were not coded as themes. If a particular quote was judged to be an indicator of more than one theme, a maximum of two themes were assigned.
Results
Five focus groups were conducted (July-August 2015), each composed of four to six participants, including at least one surgeon, one anaesthetist, one nurse and one operating department practitioner (ODP, a member of the theatre team performing analogous roles to the anaesthetic technician and scrub nurse). Mean focus group duration was 26 AE 8 min, each producing 2998 AE 1059 words. Eight themes emerged, with a total of 18 sub-themes (Table S2 ).
Saturation was reached by group 4, with no new sub-themes emerging after this (Fig. S1 ). Each theme (underlined) is described below with underlying subthemes (bold font) and supporting quotes (Table S2): (1) Current practice: Several aspects of aviation-based practices were already being used: (i) informally in an effective manner without referring to them with formal terminology (Informal practice) and (ii) in ways that could be improved (Be better). (2) Customization: The advantage of standardization, by encouraging uniformity of practice, should be tempered with the need for variation, in response to variables such as patient physiology and the behaviour of individuals and entire teams. (3) Applicability: The indications for the various aviation-based practices were discussed as were potential limitations. These are described below with supporting quotes, as are design features to tailor them to theatre.
(e) Black-box: Although this may be useful in the future, discussion was largely focused on its limitations, with concerns that it would not elicit authentic behaviour, would invade privacy, could actually hamper performance and could generate blame in the event of an incident.
(f) Alternation of role: This was valuable to avoid fatigue, for decision-making by bringing a fresh perspective, avoiding fixation and for training. Appropriate cross-over of skills and trust in each other's skill was a prerequisite, so a degree of team familiarity would help. To ensure a smooth handover, good communication both between the alternating individuals and the entire team would be required, for example to ensure a surgeon joining an operation was familiarized with the landmarks. (g) Design features: To improve applicability in theatre, several factors to optimize the effectiveness of a potential training programme were discussed: (i) The training climate should be enjoyable, friendly and non-threatening, just like the optimum theatre climate; (ii) The entire team that regularly work together should be trained together; and (iii) Resistance factors, including difficulties around funding and dissemination of knowledge, should be recognized and addressed. (4) Team performance: Teams that worked together regularly (familiarity) were thought to be more effective for a given procedure or set of procedures. Communication was particularly key for critical or urgent messages, at the risk of sounding abrupt. Also, unlike in radio communication used in aviation, the face-to-face communication in theatre allows use of tone to convey urgency and use of names of team members to create a friendlier environment. When discussing leadership, an important point was that the leader may vary depending on the circumstances. Situational awareness is also critical for team performance, particularly with sub-teams (i.e. surgical and anaesthetic) working on different sides of the surgical drapes. Although it is sometimes possible to gauge the situation in the other sub-team, this is not always the case and an issue in for example the surgical field may not manifest immediately in the anaesthetic field. (5) Human factors: These were classified at four levels. Organizational culture of healthcare lags behind other industries with regard to teamwork training. Areas that could be improved included shift patterns, skill-mix and patterns of theatre use to avoid emergency operating being done unnecessarily late at night. In the theatre climate, the surgeon was perceived to have a dominant influence, and although there were many potential sources of distraction, it was also a source of satisfaction and enjoyment for staff. Hierarchy was viewed a negative factor, particularly in regard to individuals high up in the hierarchy with difficult personalities. Culture-specific behaviour in a hierarchy was also mentioned, such as willingness to seek help. Individual traits had a prominent role, including the effects of a language barrier, innate team-working ability and enthusiasm towards teamwork.
(6) Analogy: The benefit of the aviation surgery analogy (cockpit-operating theatre) was recognized, with aviation having both the proven safety record and the shock factor to gain attention. Its limitations were also discussed, including radio communication in aviation necessitating read-back for some radio messages and differences in aetiology of incidents. (7) Incidents: It was acknowledged that incidents occur at work, and some specific examples were cited. The debrief process after an incident was lacking, with consequences for learning and staff support. A 'black-box' type recording might be useful for analysing an incident, but has its limitations (see theme 'Applicability'). The normal audit (morbidity and mortality) meetings which surgeons attend are not attended by the rest of the theatre team, and therefore do not fulfil this role for the team. (8) Integration of skills: There were several axes running across the aviation-based practices. Situational awareness was connected with the sterile cockpit rule. In what may be termed 'local' situational awareness, one team member (e.g. the scrub nurse) might detect a surgical issue and initiate a sterile cockpit. However, 'general' situational awareness was more difficult to maintain and requires good communication to share information and enhance situational awareness. CRM and black-box were linked, with a role for audio-visual recording in teamwork training. An axis also ran through checklists and standardized phraseology, with the WHO checklist already containing standardized phrases and further checklists potentially standardizing communication even more. These links between the aviation-based practices suggest the need for integration of skills into a bundle rather implementing them separately.
Aviation bundle
These results point towards a toolkit of non-technical skills that may be applied in theatre. An 'aviation bundle' has been proposed (Table 1) , which includes aviation-based practices with an emphasis on tailoring these to the theatre setting. 
Discussion
Flight is the world's safest mode of transport. Attempts to apply the aviation safety model, without modification, to the operating theatre have seen limited success. This study uniquely examines the transferability of aviation-based safety practices from a theatre staff perspective using qualitative methods. Eight themes emerged: current practice, customization, applicability, team performance, human factors, analogy, incidents and integration of skills. The success of the WHO checklist in the real world is less than in the research setting and CRM training in various forms also suffers from poor long-term results. The reasons for this are complex. To generate sustained improvement, training is required and this should have a positive impact on participants at several levels: 15 'reactions' to the course should be positive; 'learning' should improve knowledge, skills and attitudes; 'behaviour' should therefore change; and this will be reflected in the 'results' of an organization, that is efficiency and quality.
The limited success of the WHO checklist may be due to inadequate impact at the 'behaviour' level, with poor compliance reported in the literature, 16 particularly in the 'sign-out' stage. 17, 18 Our work sheds light on the cause of this. The rationale behind the checklist is not fully appreciated. It is often a tick-box exercise without triggering the required thinking behind the question, highlighting inadequate impact at the 'learning' level. CRM training has been plagued by poor long-term results and high costs 13 and although staff agree that CRM training would reduce errors, 19 this is not reflected in their long-term behaviour after training. 20 There was also resistance to CRM training, 21, 22 particularly from medical staff, who felt disinclined to discuss errors and viewed the training as remedial. Our work shows that many aspects of CRM are already being performed (theme 'current practice'). It is therefore important to highlight that CRM is not a revolution, but a developmental increment of what is already being done. This may improve its effectiveness. Citing surgical incidents, as well as selected aviation accidents, may reduce recurrence of similar errors in theatre. 23 Our study goes beyond the findings of earlier studies and identifies potential barriers to aviation-based training. Recognizing the extent and limitations of the analogy, and delivering training that is relevant to the operating theatre are essential. The advanced safety culture permeating aviation contrasts with the situation in surgery, and may be a barrier to transferability. Integration of the various practices into an 'aviation bundle' will help because they overlap considerably (e.g. situational awareness and sterile cockpit). Furthermore, delivery in an integrated way will promote the change in safety culture required. The impact of human factors at various levels in an organization should be considered, as they may create resistance if mismanaged or drive progress if harnessed.
Decision-making did not emerge as a sub-theme, yet it is classified as a non-technical skill in aviation. 7 This may indicate a need for more explicit decision-making through shared information and shared understanding across the entire team, as implied in the 'situational awareness' sub-theme. Nor were patient outcomes explicitly mentioned, perhaps because the link between intraoperative course and the ultimate post-operative outcome is not always obvious, particularly for staff based only in theatre.
Limitations of this study could have arisen from the methodology. Inclusion of only participants who responded showing interest could introduce bias by self-selection. This is a recognized issue 24 that may affect generalizability. Focus groups could lead to group polarization or conversely disagreement between participants. These issues did not arise; there was open discussion and a spectrum of opinions emerged. This spectrum includes differences in opinion, which helped identify indications and limitations of the various aviation-based practices and highlights how critical it is to tailor them to the operating theatre, and also incorporate other contextual factors such as organizational culture, individual personality and type of operation. The human-machine interface is an important part of human factors, cockpit design 25 and theatre design. This was beyond the scope of this study and is an avenue for future research. There are some fundamental differences between pilots and surgeons. Pilots have a limited relationship with their passengers, with no preflight contact and only limited in-flight contact. In contrast, surgeons develop professional relationships with patients preoperatively and post-operatively, often spanning several years. The pilotpassenger relationship is more consistent with the business models we see in aviation, and the methods enforced in their drive for excellence. 26 The surgeon-patient relationship is more personal and so the business model often does not sit so well. The work environment also differs. The cockpit door is closed during the flight and the pilot's entire focus is on flying the aircraft, which has predictable behaviour, through largely predictable weather and geography. A zero incident rate is in principle possible and has in fact been recorded. 27 In contrast, the theatre door is seldom closed. The surgeon, while operating, may have to simultaneously manage distant tasks (e.g. care of other inpatients) and have conversations that are not related to the procedure in hand. Patient physiology, anatomy and pathology are variable and the course of a given operation is far less predictable. This variation and pathology make complications inevitable and only a proportion of these are avoidable. 28 The limitations of the analogy are relevant.
The results of this study highlight the need to tailor aviationbased practices to work effectively in theatre. The aviation bundle is a blueprint to achieve this. Although this study has not evaluated the efficacy of the aviation bundle, it helps define the factors to be considered when designing a training course. We envisage it will be a toolkit rather than a set of mandatory operating procedures and to be taught along similar lines to how surgery is taught at present. Just as the main steps in a particular operation are taught and specific steps left to the discretion of the operating surgeon, so these non-technical elements can be taught and integrated as required into everyday theatre teamwork. Further work is required to design, deliver and evaluate the 'aviation bundle' training course.
In summary, the airline industry leads the way in safety. To be effective in theatre, aviation-based practices must be carefully designed and piloted. This study identifies their applicability and limitations. This is a step towards safety and efficiency becoming an integral feature of health care.
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